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The Farm Corporation
As an Estate Planning Device
"Yesterday the farmer was a manager of labor; today he is a man-
ager of capitaLl.
I. INTRODUCTION
The farmer and rancher in the United States have departed from
the era when the fruits of agricultural enterprise were primarily
the product of one's hands, and have entered an era of declining la-
bor input and continually expanding employment of capital.2 Very
few agricultural units were subject to estate tax when the $60,000
federal estate tax exemption was adopted in 1942.3 Since that time
the average investment per farm in the United States has increased
almost 1,000 per cent, while the exemption remains at the same
level.4 During the same period, Nebraska farm vaules have in-
creased more than eightfold, with the compound rate of increase
since 1941 exceeding seven per cent.5
* B.S.C., 1950, LL.B., 1952, University of Nebraska. Member, Nebraska
State and American Bar Associations; Fellow American College of
Probate Counsel.
1. Fleming, An Overall Look at Estate Planning, 45 ILL. B.J. 452 (Supp.
1957).
2. Hines, Special Problems in Planning the Agricultural Businessman's
Estate, 1973 EST. PLrs. INST. 73-11. Contemporary Studies Project:
Large Farm Estate Planning and Probate in Iowa, 59 IowA L. Rnv. 794
(1974) (a major empirical study statistically tabulating the use of var-
ious estate planning devices in the state of Iowa, and discussing their
advantages and disadvantages in terms of the individual farm estate
and in terms of farm economics) [hereinafter cited as Large Farm
Estates].
3. Hopkin, Agricultural Farm Growth and Liquidity Dimensions of Two
Proposed Changes in Federal Estate Taxes, 12, APPENDix TO THE STATE-
MENT OF NATIONAL IzvESTocx TAx Comm., CoMm. ON WAYs & MEANS,
U.S. CONG., March 29, 1973.
4. Id. Specifically, gross capital employed in United States agriculture
increased from $52.9 billion in 1940 to $478.8 billion in 1974. U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIcULTURE, THE FA~m bNDEx 16 (1974).
5. UNV. or NEBRAsKA ExTENsIoN SERvIcE, CORNHUSmm EcoNoMucs
(March 6, 1974). Land values rose an additional 28 per cent in north-
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This vast increase in employed capital is the result of inflation
and increased land investment.6 Agriculture has become highly
capital intensive. More and more dependence is placed on econo-
mies of size, and a climate which encourages increasingly large cap-
ital concentrations is required.
On the other hand, the average rate of return on assets invested
in agriculture has been relatively low, averaging scarcely 3 per
cent.7 This is extremely low in relation to the market value of the
capital assets employed in agriculture, and thus the predominant
element in the increased family farm wealth has been the long run
inflationary rise in land values.8 The nature of modern agricul-
tural activity thus subordinates present financial benefit to the
growth of future capital wealth.
The income tax treatment of both agricultural income and cap-
ital enhances and exagerates this aspect of agricultural economies.
The availability of cash basis income tax accounting 9 encourages
the development of wealth through increased (but income tax de-
ferred) inventories of grain or livestock, at the sacrifice of immedi-
ate spendable income. The Internal Revenue Code ("Code") pro-
vision creating a step-up in the income tax basis of property to its
market value at the owner's date of death10 provides an additional
incentive for retaining property having an inflated value.
These factors reflect, and in turn are reflected by, the farm fam-
ily's tendency to develop the family enterprise instead of purchas-
ern plains states in 1974. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 16, 1974, at 26, col.
1. The 22 per cent increase in the 12 months ending November 1, 1973,
was one of the sharpest rises in history. Id.
6. See Hines, supra note 2, at 11-2, citing CENTE FoR AGRIcULTURAL &
EcoNolvc DEVELOPMENT, U.S. AGmicumTUHE iN 1980, 3 ISU 5 (1966), to
the effect that "[ilt is likely that in 20 years or less, capital will repre-
sent more than 90% of all input used in U.S. farming, and labor no
more than 10%."
An example of increased land values is the development of irri-
gated land. From 1968 through 1972, the average yearly increase in
irrigated acreage in Nebraska was 234,000 acres. U.S. DEP'T or AGRi-
CULTURE, NEBRASKA STATE-FEDERAL DivisioN OF AGRICULTURAL STATIS-
Tics. Assuming an enhancement in value of only $300 per acre, the
resulting increase in land values would exceed $70,000,000 a year.
7. INTmAL REVmNuE SsivicE, BusnqEss Ixcoi~m TAX RETuExs, STATIS-
TiCS oF INc mE (1965 & 1966). See Estate of Ethel C. Dooly, 31 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 814, 820 (1972).
8. See THE FAam INEx, supra note 4j showing an increase in real estate
gross values from 33.6 billion in 1940 to 325.3 billion in 1974.
9. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12 (1969). See Branscomb, The Cash Method as
Applied to Agriculture-A Reexamination, 25 TAX LAwYFR 125 (1971).
10. IwT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1014(a) [hereinafter cited as CODE].
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ing other need-satisfying items. The serpentine form of the federal
estate tax has intruded into this delicately balanced (if not idyllic)
complex of economics, tax incentives, and emotion. At former asset
values, the relationship of the value to the estate tax exemption,
the availability of the marital deduction," and the ability to avoid
capital gain once a generation' 2 left little tax impact on the accu-
mulation of capital on a multi-generational basis. However, as the
impact of the estate tax has increased because of inflating asset val-
ues, the ability to preserve capital from one generation to the next
is seriously jeopardized. 13 Even when the optimal sequence of
deaths allows full credit for previously taxed property coming into
the hands of the surviving spouse, liquidation ultimately may be
required because the taxes increase more rapidly than the ability
to pay them. Further, succeeding operators may 'have to fund leg-
acies to absentee heirs because the parents believed these legacies
necessary to assure fair treatnent of their children. As a result,
the farm or ranch unit which has not been organized to anticipate
the problems of transfer at death tends to become overburdened
with debt, sold, or drastically reduced in size with a resulting loss
of economies achieved by the parents.14 As one author has noted,
11. CODE § 2056.
12. Gain can be avoided on operating inventory as well as capital assets.
See note 52 and accompanying text infra.
13. The increasing problem of farm fragmentation, and its destructive in-
fluence on economic operation of agricultural enterprises is discussed
in Large Farm Estates, supra note 2, at 934.
14. In a study of the impact of federal estate taxes on agriculture, Epp
and Perry used a financial model based on a 330 breeding cow ranch
with a gross value of $510,000 on January 1, 1973, and all ownership
in joint tenancy. Even with an optimum sequence of deaths, the re-
sulting estate tax was approximately one-fourth of the gross asset
value, and the ultimate liquidation of the ranch was projected. UN-v.
or NEiRAsKA DEP'T OF AGRIcuLTmR, T M SAND HIILS RANCH BUSINESS,
1970 and COMPARISONS wnT 1960 Am 1965 (1972). Extending this
model ten years into the future, with a 7 per cent yearly increase in
asset value, illustrates the rapid increase in estate taxes. In 1983 there
would a gross estate of $867,000 representing a 70 per cent increase
in value over the 10 years. With ever increasing inflation of operating
costs, this probably does not represent a proportionate increase in in-
come. The estate tax approximately doubles to roughly $254,000, rep-
resenting 32 per cent of the family's net worth. Assuming that 25 per
cent of the net worth is represented by livestock, the estate tax would
require the use of all the personal property and the sale of about
$50,000 of land. The need for proper estate planning is obvious. It
has been noted:
... the agricultural estate planner has a special obligation
to utilize those techniques for the intergenerational transfer
of farm wealth which are most consistent with preserving
the economies of size which are becoming essential to
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"when an efficient farm unit must be liquidated to meet estate
taxes, society tends to be the loser."'15
The problems resulting from inflationary tendencies' 6 are com-
pounded by the changes in the Code made by H.R. 421, recently
passed which increases the interest rate on deferred estate taxes
under section 6166 and 6161 from four per cent to nine per cent
effective July 1, 1975.17
In the. present economic and tax atmosphere, incorporation of
the family agricultural unit is an increasingly popular method of
accomodating both death taxes and family inheritance.' To some
degree the advantages of incorporation are inherent advantages of
thoughtful organization of the agricultural business and the crea-
tion of vehicles for the ownership of agricultural assets capable of
facilitating necessary estate planning transfers.19 But certain attri-
survival of the family farm unit. More specifically, estate
planning devices which allow transfer of farm assets without
fragmenting the farm operation should be given high prior-
ity by the agricultural estate planner".
Large Farm Estates, supra note 2, at 934.
15. Supra note 3, at 12.
16, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, ECoNoMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, No. 242, IN-
CREASING IMPACT OF FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES ON THE FARM SEC-
TOR (July, 1973). This study shows that total death taxes as a per
cent of total farm capital reached 19 per cent in 1968 for cattle ranches
in the northern plains.
17. In recent years the Committee has also intensively studied con-
solidation of gift and estate taxes (thus effectively eliminating the
advantage of lifetime gifts) and eliminating the step-up in income tax
basis of assets passing through the estate. Covey, Estate and Gift Tax
Revision, Part 1, 4 TAX ADVISOR 218 (April 1973) and Part II, 4 TAX
ADVIsoR 274 (May 1973).
18. See Harl, The Farm and Ranch Corporation-Business Organizational
Form of the Future, 43 NEB. L. REV., 365, 367 (1963). See also Large
Farm Estates, supra note 2, at. 799. One author has summarized the
advantages of using the corporate entity as an estate planning device:
The corporate entity is the most protective cloak in which
the farm assets can be enveloped. Most existing family farm
corporations are estate-planning inspired, in the sense that
they were created to facilitate the intergeneration transfer
of the farm business .... In contrast to the partnership, the
corporate farm offers much greater stability and the inter-
ests in the enterprise are more divisible than with a trust.
Yet, functionally, the farm may have the same degree of con-
trol as a sole proprietorship .... Separate interests in the
business may be transferred by a gift or the sale of stock
without disturbing the working control over the operation.
Hines, supra note 2, at 73-11 to -30.
19. The 1969 Census of Agriculture showed that of the 1,733,683 commer-
cial farms in the United States, 1,480,565 were operated as sole pro-
prietorships, 221,535 as partnerships, 19,716 as corporations with ten
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butes of holding assets in the corporate form provide unique estate
planning advantages unobtainable through other means of asset
holding and transmission.20
This article will not compare the estate planning advantages of
incorporation with income tax or other disadvantages of an incor-
porated operation. Rather, the purpose of this article is limited to
an examination of the ways in which incorporation may help
achieve the basic objectives of the estate planning process which
may be summarized as follows:
1. Optimization of the marital deduction;
2. Reduction of the gross estate through gift-giving;
3. Reduction of asset values for the purpose of estate tax
valuation;
4. Stabilization of asset values for purposes of estate tax
valuation;
5. Preservation of the family operating unit;
6. Reconsolidation of operating unit ownership in the op-
erating successors; and
7. Formulation of an effective means of estate administra-
tion and post mortem estate planning.
II. THE CLOSE CORPORATION
To optimize the use of the close corporation, an understanding
of its unique nature is necessary.21 The close corporation is not
merely a method of facilitating the holding of undivided fractional
interests in the capital property of the corporation. The properly
formed close or family corporation is a distinct and separate legal
entity from its shareholders. The corporate assets are owned, not
by the shareholders, but by the corporation.22 The shareholders'
or fewer shareholders, and 1,797 as corporations with more than ten
shareholders. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS REPORT, 1 (May 1972) cited in
Hines, supra n. 2, at 73-11 to -37.
20. The estate planner should be fully conversant with the capabilities of
trusts, see Note, Use of Intervivos Trusts in Agricultural Estate Plan-
ning, 55 IowA L. REV. 1328 (1970), partnerships, see Wright, Estate
Planning for Agricultural Interests, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 23 (1972), and
family contractual relationships, see Estate Planning Through Family
Bargaining, 8 REAL PROPERTY PROBATE & TRUST J. 223 (1973) (discuss-
ing the many types of intrafamily bargains which may be used in es-
tate planning); Eckhardt & Allen, Planning for the Farmer, 3 U.
ILL. L.F. 367, 393 (1963), as well as corporations, and be prepared to
apply these devices imaginatively in patterns and combinations that
will be most responsive to the goals and needs of the individual client.
21. See F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.01, et seq. (1958).
22. C. ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE Am OTHER BusINEss ENTRPmSES
179 (Supp. 1974).
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"ownership" is only that complex of rights and duties between the
shareholders inter sese, and the shareholders and the corporation,
which is defined by the statutes and decisions of the jurisdiction
where the corporate entity is formed. These rights vary depend-
ing upon the aggregate fraction of the corporate stock owned by the
individual shareholder, the types and classes of corporate stock cre-
ated, local law requirements relating to the stockholders' voting
power in selecting management 23 and property disposition.
The above principles have been recognized in English and Amer-
ican common law at least since 1896 when the House of Lords de-
cided Salomon v. Salomon & Co. 24 The owner of a business had in-
corporated, taking back certain secure debentures and all the com-
mon stock except one share each issued to his wife and children.
Arguments by corporate creditors that the corporation was only a
sham or Salomon's alter ego were rejected. The case held that
given proper de jure formation, a distinct legal person is created by
incorporation, regardless of the family relationship or mutual inter-
dependence of the incorporators. The principles laid down by this
decision are fundamental to an appreciation of the essential prop-
erty rights arising in corporate shareholders, 25 and may form the
basis for establishing constitutional protection against family at-
tribution among shareholders in the estate tax context through ex-
tension of the income attribution concept.26
The trend of state law decisions, tax law decisions, amendments
to the Code, and statutes in some states has been toward recogni-
tion of the unique legal status of the close corporationY.2 7 As stated
by the Supreme Court of Illinois in Galler v. Galler,28 "there has
been a definite, albeit inarticulate, trend toward eventual judicial
treatment of the close corporation as sui generis."
The Code expressly recognizes and separately treats the type of
23. See, e.g., Nm. CONST., art. XII, § 5 (cumulative voting requirement).
24. [1896J 22 A.C. 22, rev'g, Broderip v. Solomon (1895).
25. Essentially, such attribution is the Government's position in Rothgery
v. United States, U.S. TAX CAS. (73-1, at 81,242) f 12-911 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
Under the particular circumstances of the case, stock held by a family
group was valued as a unit in Estate of David J. Levenson, 18 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 535 (1959). Such an argument was advanced but not
decided upon in Estate of Robert Hosken Damon, 49 T.C. 108 (1967).
As stated in Jeannette Fitzgibbon v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 78, 84
(1952) "Transactions within a family group are subject to special scru-
tiny in order to determine if they are in economic reality what they
appear to be on their face."
26. See, e.g., CoD. § 318.
27. O'NAL, supra note 21, at § 1.09.
28. 32 Dl .2d 16, 28, 203 N.E.2d 577, 584 (1965).
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corporation having a single class of stock and ten or fewer share-
holders. This concept is found in subchapter S, allowing a small
business corporation to elect not to be taxed at the corporate level,29
section 1244 allowing an issue of stock to qualify for ordinary loss
treatment rather than capital loss treatment,30 section 6166 confin-
ing the ten year installment payment election for estate taxes to the
shareholders of such corporations in some circumstances 31 and sec-
tion 311(d) providing that distributions of appreciated property do
not have gain recognized at the corporate level.32
The general trend of legislation, as reflected in the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act,33 has been to allow increasing flexibility in
the organization of the family corporation.34 For example, the Ne-
braska Business Corporation Act now allows incorporation by one
or more incorporators35 and allows the number of directors to be
as small as desired. 6 Some state statutes even permit managerial
acts by shareholder agreement, without the possibility of partner-
ship liability, in variously defined "close corporations. ' 37 Even the
Kansas act3s attempting to restrict agricultural land holding to
small corporations having ten or less shareholders recognizes the es-
sential difference between the family corporation and the publicly
held corporation.
29. CoDE § 1371 et seq.
30. CoD. § 1244.
31. CoDE § 6166.
32. COD § 311(d) (2) (A).
33. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 21-2001 et seq. (Reissue 1970).
34. O'NAL, supra note 21, at § 1.14(a).
35. NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2051 (Supp. 1972).
36. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2036 (Supp. 1972).
37. E.g., Mo. AN. CODE art. 23, §§ 100-11 (1973); PA. STAT. AuNN. tit. 15,§§ 1371-1386 (Supp. 1974).
38. K_ .STAT. AwN. § 17-5901 (1974). The Nebraska Legislature is cur-
rently considering several bills and a possible constitutional amend-
ment concerning the regulation of corporate farming in the state. L.B.
203, L.B. 214, and L.B. 363 all seek to prohibit corporate farming with
exceptions, inter alia, for "family farm or ranch corporations." L.R. 8
was a resolution proposing an amendment to Article XII of the Ne-
braska Constitution which would prohibit corporate farming. The
resolution also contained a "family farm corporation" exclusion. L.B.
214 and L.B. 363 were indefinitely postponed. 1975 Ns.a. LEG. JNmL.
1462 (April 25, 1975). A hearing on L.R. 8 was delayed until 1976.
1975 NEB. LEG. JmL. 860 (March 12, 1975). L.B. 203 was amended by
the Committee on Agriculture and Environment to remove the pro-
hibition. Substituted were amendments to sections 76-407 and 76-408,
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 76-407, -408 (Reissue 1971), dealing with alien
ownership of land. The bill would also require corporate owners of
agricultural lands to file annual reports with the Secretary of State.
The amended bill was passed May 23, 1975, by a vote of 34-0. 1975
Nm. LEG. Jams. 2073 (May 23, 1975).
224 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 54, NO. 2 (1975)
The last bastion of resistance to recognition of both the legally
unique nature of the close corporation, and its undoubted character-
istics as a true corporation, has been the Internal Revenue Service.
A classic confrontation between the Service and the courts has been
the prolonged battle over the validity of professional corporations.
The firm posture taken by substantially all the courts passing upon
this question is that de jure formation under local law of the pro-
fessional corporation and proper compliance with legal formalities
result in full recognition of the corporate form. The ultimate sur-
render of the Service in response to this judicial action illustrates
the legal vitality of the close corporation. 2
Based upon basic state corporate and property law concepts, tax
law decisions have established fundamental differences between the
treatment of corporations as property holding mechanisms and cor-
porations used to effect the flow of taxability of the income from
incorporated assets.
Since Gregory v. Helvering,40 it has been recognized that a cor-
poration formed or availed of for the purpose of concealing the real
substance of a business transaction, and thereby avoiding an other-
wise appropriate income tax, may be disregarded. This principle
has not, however, been extended to the reallocation of property in-
terests protected by state law as opposed to the income from such
property.4 1 In Moline Properties v. Commissioner,42 the United
States Supreme Court stated that the purpose of incorporation is
immaterial and said, "so long as that purpose is the equivalent of
business activity or is followed by the carrying on of business by
the corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxable en-
tity."143
The Service has continually attempted to establish that a cor-
poration must carry on an "active business" for judicial recognition
of its valid and independent existence. This position was rejected
by the Second Circuit in Commissioner v. State-Adams Corp.
44
The question presented was whether a corporation, the only asset
of which was a long term lease to a department store, should be
39. See Weinberg, A Brief Look at the Advantages and Disadvantages of
Professional Incorporation, 6 CREiGHTON L. REv. 17 (1972).
40. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
41. Cf. Brooke v. United States U.S. TAx CAs. (72-2, at 85,399) 9594 (9th
Cir. 1972) where the court refused to tax income to the grantor from
a gift lease-back situation because of substance supplied to the trans-
action by state law duties.
42. 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
43. Id. at 439.
44. 283 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1960); cert. denied, 365 U.S. 844 (1961).
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recognized for income tax purposes. The lease had been assigned
to the corporation in return for its promissory note payable to the
prior lessor for life, with the interest being equivalent to the
amount of the net rent. The only activities of the corporation were
holding the lease and taking steps necessary to continue its corpo-
rate existence. The Fifth Circuit later characterized this in Britt v.
United States:45 "The Court held that a corporation formed to fa-
cilitate the devolution of property, which merely holds title, col-
lects rent from lessees, and distributes the income, is engaged in
business and will be taxed as a separate entity."48
A somewhat similar situation arose in Howell v. Commissioner.47
There, the only corporate assets consisted of a tract of unimproved
real estate the sale of which resulted in realized capital gain. The
Service attempted to prevent passthrough of this capital gain under
the subchapter S election for taxation at the shareholder level. The
Tax Court held there was no active business requirement imposed
upon subchapter S corporations by statute, and that the conduct of
an "active business" was not necessary for recognition of the cor-
porate form.
The use of the words "formed to facilitate the devolution of
property" in the Britt case is significant. If a valid corporation
may be formed under tax law for the sole purpose of holding prop-
erty and transferring stock ownership to a succeeding generation,
the entire complex of corporate/shareholder rights, duties, and state
law remedies comes into play. This will inevitably affect the tax-
ability and valuation of the corporate shares in the hands of the
shareholders.
The corporate form may be used purely for estate planning
purposes. In Harrison Property Management Co.,48 two brothers
and a sister having equal interests in oil properties transferred the
properties to a corporation primarily to facilitate the continued
operation of the business in the case of the death of one of them.
The shareholders paid over all the profits to themselves and re-
ported the profits on their individual returns. They did not file
corporate returns but reported the corporation's activities on a fi-
duciary return. The court held the corporation was organized for
a legitimate business purpose, the avoidance of continuity problems
in the case of death of a shareholder.
45. 431 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1970), reversing Britt v. United States 292 F.
Supp. 6 (M.D. Fla. 1968).
46. 431 F. Supp. at 237.
47. 57 T.C. 546 (1972), acquiescing.
48. 475 F.2d 623 (Ct. CL 1973).
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In Britt v. United States49 the taxpayers, who were partners in
a citrus grove business, formed three corporations into which they
distributed certain percentages of their partnership shares. Stock
of the corporations was given to two children of one of the part-
ners and a sister of the partners. The corporations maintained com-
plete records and received distributions from the partnership. The
corporations were admittedly formed for the sole purpose of facili-
tating the transfer to the children of interests in the partnership.
The Service argued that the corporation should be disregarded and
the income taxed to the shareholders as if they were individually
business partners. The Fifth Circuit held that the holding of prop-
erty for the purpose of passing it to a succeeding generation is a
sufficient business purpose and such a corporation is not a sham
to be ignored for tax purposes.
Recognition that the complex of legal rights between the corpo-
ration, the majority shareholder, and the minority shareholders es-
tablishes legally separate property relationships which are not to
be lightly disregard was apparent in Byrum v. United States.50
The donor transferred a block of common voting stock to an irre-
vocable trust for his children, but retained the power to vote the
stock and veto the sale of shares by the trustee. The Court held
that neither the reservation of powers of management alone nor
the retention of the right to vote the transferred shares constitutes
a reservation of possession and enjoyment or a transfer with the
right to designate the persons who will enjoy the property under
section 2036. 51 The question of whether Byrum will be extended
to reservations of voting control under circumstances where there
are no non-family minority shareholders, as there were in Byrum,
remains unresolved.
II. MARITAL DEDUCTION PLANNING
Achieving the optimum federal estate tax marital deduction in
the agricultural estate presents some unique difficulties. The de-
sire to hold the operating unit intact, however, is fully compatible
with the necessities of planning the non-marital share of the estate.
Since the family farm or ranch properties are generally to be passed
to the successor operators at the end of the surviving spouse's life-
time, the family goals are furthered by restricting the surviving
spouse's interest in the non-marital portion to income. The prob-
49. 292 F. Supp. 6 (M.D. Fla. 1968).
50. 408 U.S. 125 (1972), rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 898 (1972).
51. E.g., Covey, 3 TAx AvisER 644 (1972), which contains a thorough dis-
cussion of the implications and limitations of the Byrum case.
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lem is how best to achieve the necessary apportionment of assets.
If land comprises substantially all the assets involved, the de-
vise of an undivided one-half interest to the suriving spouse in
fee, and a legal life estate with gift over to the children (or a limited
power of appointment in the surviving spouse) in the residue will
suffice.5 2  Generally, however, substantial chattel property in the
form of livestock and machinery is involved. Such short-lived
items do not conveniently lend themselves to legal life estate and
remainder treatment. If it is necessary to channel such property
to the portion of the owner's estate not qualifying for the marital
deduction (with the converse elimination of such property from
taxation in the survivor's estate) some ownership vehicle allowing
for separation of lifetime and remainder interests is necessary. The
corporation will serve this purpose in the same manner as a trust
or limited partnership.5 3
If substantially all the assets are incorporated and there is little
life insurance or other property passing outside the probate estate,
corporate stock may be bequeathed one-half to the surviving spouse
outright and one-half to the surviving spouse for life with remain-
der to designated children or subject to a limited power of appoint-
ment.54 If a more complex asset mix is involved, corporate stock,
because of its incremental nature, lends itself to the application of
a pecuniary formula marital deduction clause. Real estate, on the
other hand, requires the use of a fractional share marital deduction
clause if the situation requires formula-type distribution. Frac-
tional share clauses may present some disadvantages since the ulti-
mate fractional interest in the subject assets cannot be determined
until conclusion of the federal estate tax audit.55
Livestock, grain or other property subject to price changes on
a readily ascertainable public market may have disadvantages in
52. Logan, Problems of the Farmer in Dispositions by Will, 32 ROCKY MT.
L. REv. 329 (1960), develops in detail the uses, problems and forms for
nonmarital legacies by means of life estate and limited power of ap-
pointment.
53. See Kelley, Estate Planning for Farmers and Ranchers, 20 PRAc. LAw.
13 (1974); Large Farm Estates, supra note 2, at 876.
54. The marital portion should, of course, be exonerated from the payment
of federal estate tax in order to preserve the optimum deduction.
55. Tarbox, The Pregnant Marital Deduction, 1973 TRUSTS & EsTATEs 414.
This article includes a discussion of the problems and methods of ad-
ministering marital deduction clauses. In the estate involving agricul-
tural land, delay in ascertaining the exact fractional shares of owner-
ship between the marital and non-marital portions may not be a sig-
nificant disadvantage where there is no intention to sell or borrow
against the real estate involved.
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funding a pecuniary formula marital deduction clause, because a
pecuniary formula clause drawn to avoid the impact of Revenue
Procedure 64-1956 will result in the realization of gain on any in-
crease in value between the estate tax valuation date and the dis-
tribution date.57 In these situations the realized gain may be sub-
stantial if the alternate valuation date is not elected.58 This prob-
lem may be avoided by using incorporated assets. Stock has a wide
range of debatable value, is not subject to any particular market
and there is little likelihood of value fluctuation between the date
of death and distribution.
Pecuniary formula clause distribution problems are avoided
when all personal property is left outright to the wife and the bal-
ance of the marital fraction is carved out of real estate by using
a fractional share formula. This, however, results in a difficult
funding situation since the only available resource for paying the
estate tax is the non-marital share of the real estate. If corporate
stock is used for the marital portion, the residue may include liquid
assets suitable for estate tax funding, or the estate tax may be paid
by redeeming corporate shares from the stock remaining after the
marital share is funded.5 9
Conventional stock may be used in typical marital deduction
trust arrangements. Shares of stock in a subchapter S corporation
may not, however, be bequeathed in trust without causing termina-
tion of the election.60 Similar restrictions apply to section 1244
stock." But stock readily lends itself to the creation of various
legal estates, including a legal life estate in the surviving spouse
with remainder passing pursuant to a special power of appointment
given the life tenant. If such an approach is taken, provisions
should be included for handling the proceeds of the sale of stock
56. Rev. Pro. 64-19, 1964 IwT. REv. BULL. at 682.
57. Id. Dalton, General View of Marital Deduction Planning, 45 NEB. L.
REv. 414, 427 (1966).
58. If distribution occurs within the first 6 months it may be that short
term gain treatment of Code § 1231 livestock assets may be avoided
following the Tax Reform Act of 1969. See note 201 and accompany-
ing text infra.
59. The basics of tax free stock redemtion under Code § 303 are discussed
in Miller, Several Routes Are Available to Obtain an Extension of
Time for Payment of Estate Taxes, 1974 TAXATION FOR LAWYERS 96, and
see Rev. Rul. 72-188, 1972-1 Cum. BULL. 383. Stock redeemed from the
marital trust is eligible for waiver of family attribution under Code§ 318(5) (c). Estate of Crawford, 59 T.C. 830 (1973). See also Estate
of Pearl Gibbons Reynolds, 55 T.C. 172 (1970).
60. CODE § 1371 (a) (2).
61. CODE § 1244(a) (4).
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if the life tenant is given the power to sell.62 If there are not direc-
tions for applying the proceeds of the sale, the life tenant may be
taxed on the proceeds as having the equivalent of fee ownership.63
Preferably, it should be directed that the proceeds be placed in trust
with typical non-marital trust provisions.6"
Where more than one corporation is involved, and sufficient
shares of a corporation not requiring subchapter S election are
available, the subchapter S shares may be given outright as the
marital share and conventional shares may be passed into a typical
nonmarital trust.65 If the corporation has both common and pre-
ferred stock, a subchapter S election is not available, and either
class of stock may be placed in trust. In such a situation it may
be preferable to pass the preferred stock as part of the marital leg-
acy, either outright to the wife or to a full ownership trust, with
the common shares passing to the non-marital trust. This prevents
any growth of the common shares from being taxed in surviving
spouse's estate.
If a marital trust with a general power of appointment is de-
sired for purposes of avoiding probate of the surviving spouse's
estate, or otherwise, funding with close corporation stock without
a dividend history should be avoided. Such stock may be non-in-
come producing property under Regulation 20.2056(b) (5),66 and
therefore would not qualify as marital deduction property. A simi-
lar result can be achieved, however, by giving the surviving spouse
a legal life estate with a general power of appointment over the
remainder by lifetime instrument. 7 If a marital trust is considered
indispensible and must be funded with such stock, the trust should
be drawn as an estate trust (legal life estate in the surviving spouse
with remainder passing to the spouse's estate) or the surviving
spouse should have a complete power to withdraw the stock during
lifetime.68
Stock may be used to channel ownership into both spouses to
create asset ownership to provide a hedge against the sequence of
62. Generally as to the handling of the sale of property subject to legal
life estates and remainders see Casner, Legal Life Estates and Powers
of Appointment Coupled with Life Estates and Trusts, 45 NEB. L. REv.
342, 347 (1966).
63. See Draper v. Piedmont Trust Bank, 214 Va. 59, 197 S.E.2d 178 (1973).
See Dalton, supra note 57, at 419.
64. Casner, supra note 62.
65. AMERIcAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PuBLic ACcOUNTANTS, ESTATE PLAN-
NING FOR THE OWNER OF A CLOSELY HELD ENTERPRISE 1-42 (1973).
66. Casner, ESTATE PLANNING 844 (Supp. 1974).
67. Id. at 1575.
68. Id.
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death. If joint tenancy property or property held in common forms
part of the capital contributions to the corporation, the stock re-
flecting these assets may be issued proportionately to each spouse.
This may be used to work toward equalization of property holdings
when no gift tax consequences result.69 Each spouse may then
by-pass the estate of the other with all or a portion of the owned
stock, thereby hedging against the sequence of deaths. Corporate
stock forms an ideal medium for such by-pass bequests since the
surviving spouse will have the power to vote both marital and non-
marital portions and to receive all the dividends.
If joint tenancy real estate is contributed to the corporation, cer-
tain unanticipated gift tax consequences may arise. Creating such
a joint tenancy between husband and wife does not result in a tax-
able gift unless an election to that effect is made.7 ° Termination
of the joint tenancy results in a taxable gift to the extent of one-
half the amount by which the contributions of one spouse to the
joint tenancy exceed the contributions of the other.71 The transmu-
tation of the joint tenancy real estate into joint tenancy stock is
a termination of the real estate joint tenancy and constitutes a tax-
able event. Such a situation should, therefore, be approached with
the same precautions as any termination of joint tenancy real es-
tate ownership between husband and wife.7 2 The respective con-
tributions of the spouses should be ascertained to determine wheth-
er a significant gift would be made. If so, a decision must be made
concerning whether gift tax exemptions should be used in this
transaction or for gifts to children. The latter use is generally a
preferable application of the exemption. If fact situations com-
parable to the cases of Estate of Everett Otte7 3 or Rose v. Commis-
69. Jointly held chattel property is already owned equally by the joint
tenants for gift tax purposes. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h) (5) (1958).
Care should be exercised when using property such as joint checking,
accounts or joint savings accounts, as corporate contributions, as to
which there is no completed gift until withdrawal by the non-contrib-
uting joint tenant. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511 (h) (4) (1958). Issuance of
corporate stock in one-half interest each to the joint tenants would
be the equivalent of withdrawal from the account.
70. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(b) (regarding transfers after 1954).
71. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(d) (1954).
72. Nebraska Probate Code, NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2352 (Supp. 1974) allows
disclaimer by a surviving joint tenant of interest received upon the
death of a joint tenant after January 1, 1977. It also allows, for the
first time, post-mortem planning when joint tenancies are involved.
73. 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 301 (1972). The full time services of a farm
wife during the period of acquisition of joint tenancy real estate were
held to constitute contributions in money or moneys worth of a suffi-
cient amount to eliminate one-half the value of that real estate from
estate taxation in the estate of the husband.
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sioner7 4 are involved, the termination of the joint tenancy may not
result in a gift even if cash contributions were not made. These
cases indicate the services of the wife during the course of acquisi-
tion of the joint tenancy property may constitute contribution in
money or money's worth to the acquisition. The decedent in Otte
had purchased a tract in his name in 1932, and placed it in joint
tenancy with his wife in 1958. The court held that her activities
throughout the years of the marital community represented a con-
tribution to the joint tenancy property in money's worth to the
extent of half its value, without regard to the delay in placing the
property in joint tenancy. The court stated:
Although the home place was held by the decedent in his own
name until 1938, we believe the enhanced value of the home place
resulting from decedent's and Laura's efforts working together as
a "team" constitutes jointly acquired property subject to equal di-
vision for estate tax purposes.75
The court emphasized that the small amount of equity in the prop-
erty prior to existence of the marital community was also impor-
tant.
If substantially all the property of the parents is in joint ten-
ancy ownership, and no significant gift problem arises upon termi-
nation of the joint tenancy, the opportunity is presented to issue
50 per cent of the stock to each, and by making small gifts of stock
to the children the property holding of each spouse may be reduced
to a minority position. Thus a substantial reduction of estate tax
values76 may be achieved in both estates.
77
Finally, the case of Winkle v. United States75 raises a consider-
ation to be aware of when close corporation stock is used for all
or part of a marital deduction legacy. In that case, a stock sale
restriction agreement required that stock owned by the surviving
74. 32 CCH Tax. Ct. Mem. 207 (1973). Taxpayer's husband operated a
coal mining company as sole proprietor. After the husband's death,
the taxpayer's wife endeavored to deduct one-half of the carry forward
net operating loss of the business against her later income. It was
held that the taxpayer's activities constituted participation in the busi-
ness and the court held for the taxpayer. A factor in the decision was
that the taxpayer released her marital rights in the husband's prop-
erty when pledged for business borrowing.
75. 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 307.
76. See Section V infra.
77. Cf. Sundquist v. United States, U.S. TAx CAs. (74-2, at 85,868) 13,035
(E.D. Wash. 1974) holding that a husband and wife owned 50 per cent
each of a 55 per cent block of stock in a family corporation, that the
same was not community property, and that the stockholding of each
should be valued as minority stock and discounted accordingly.
78. U.S. TAX CAS. (74-1, at 84,412) 12,994 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
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wife would have to be sold back to the corporation or given by
her will to specified family members. The court concluded that
the agreement was incorporated by reference in the testator's will
and that as a result, the testator intended to give his wife a termin-
able life estate only, rather than fee interest in the given stock.
Her power of appointment was therefore not exercisable "alone and
in all events,"79 because of the controls imposed by the restriction
agreement. In the preparation of stock restrictions agreements in
such situations, the problems raised by Winkle should be carefully
considered and the agreement and wills prepared accordingly.
IV. GIFT PLANNING
Assuming that passage of the agricultural enterprise intact to
the next generation is a primary objective of the estate plan, the
sine qua non for achieving this objective is adequate provision for
the payment of death taxes. To the succeeding generation the abil-
ity to make payment of death taxes from liquid assets, or borrowing
which does not create a business handicap, is not merely a desir-
able enhancement of inheritance, but is indispensable if the employ-
ment and life style to which the heir may be irretrievably commit-
ted are to be maintained.80
The liquidity problem may be approached either by increasing
the liquid composition of the estate through savings or insurance,
or by planning toward the reduction of the estate tax. Marital de-
duction optimization,8' is the first step in planning for such reduc-
tion. Normally, the next step is to make gifts to members of the
succeeding generation.
Historically, agricultural families have been reluctant to under-
take lifetime intergeneration transfers.8 2 Because federal estate
tax law allows gifts not made in contemplation of death to escape
estate taxation,83 and because significant asset value may be re-
moved from the highest marginal estate tax bracket to the lowest
marginal gift tax bracket, after gift tax exemptions have been ex-
hausted, farm families have been compelled to revise radically their
attitudes concerning lifetime transfers. A tendency toward making
substantial intergeneration transfers during the parents' lifetime,
rather than confining gifts to testamentary activity only, is appear-
ing. This has resulted in the transferees participating more exten-
79. CODE § 2056(b) (5).
80. Hines, supra note 2, at 11-6.
81. See Section III supra.
82. Fleming, supra note 1, at 454.
83. CODE § 2035.
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sively in management during the parent's lifetime, and in a tend-
ency for the parent to move toward retirement or semi-retirement
in later years.84 The estate tax has thus indirectly stimulated life-
time successions to supersede wholly testamentary successions. The
severity of the federal estate tax, and the incongruity of the federal
estate and gift tax law as it presently exists has thus resulted,
paradoxically, in a changing pattern which may be socially and eco-
nomically desirable in its contribution toward preserving the family
farm by ameliorating the "family farm cycle."
If the liquidity of the estate, when coupled with adequate mari-
tal deduction planning, is sufficient to discharge death taxes, a sub-
stantial gift program is unnecessary from the tax point of view.
However, in terms, of the present minimum capital needs of the
typical family farm or ranch enterprise, compared with the federal
estate tax structure, such a situation is becoming less and less com-
mon.85 Generally, it is neither desired nor desirable to force the
heirs into a situation of borrowing the necessary estate tax funds,
since the economic health of the enterprise may be critically de-
pendent upon achieving the minimum possible fixed debt load. Ag-
riculture's typically low income to asset ratio, the volatility of the
markets for its products, and the ever increasing cost of overhead
and interest tend to make the prudent operator believe that his
debt load is never as low as it should be. Quite possibly the parent
would prefer to reduce estate tax through a lifetime gift program
rather than leave the property to the heir to "pay for the place
twice."
Assuming the operator conceives the farm or ranch to be an inte-
grated unit, and assuming the case in which the operating unit en-
compasses subsantially all the net worth of the operator, the prob-
lem in gift planning is to find a way to "divide an asset that is
functionally indivisible."8 6  Gifts of specific items of machinery,
specific livestock, and tracts of land or undivided interests in land,
may be made. Even when made to apparent successor operators,
the gift of such assets, to the extent they are included in an inte-
grated unit, involves a generally unacceptable loss of control. Such
gifts are generally unsuitable for estate beneficiaries who will not
be involved in the ongoing operation. Neither can gifts be made
which would involve an unacceptable diversion of excess income
from contributions to the ever increasing capital needs of agricul-
ture.
84. Boehlje, Intergeneration Transfers: Is Agriculture Unique?, 1973
TRUSTS & ESTATES 172.
85. Hines, supra note 2, at 11-6.
86. Id. at 11-8.
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A common approach where gifts to successor owners are desired,
particularly coincident with the retirement of the parent, is to make
a contract sale to the successor followed by regular gifts in the form
of cancellations of indebtedness to the extent the parent does not
need income for living expenses. Careful thought to the estate tax
problems created by this approach is necessary since Hudspeth v.
Commissioner.8 7 There the Tax Court disallowed an interest deduc-
tion taken by a son who was purchasing assets from his parent,
where a regular pattern of gifts back to the son in the amount of
the installment payments was being made. Further, it has been sug-
gested that such a situation may be subject to estate tax under sec-
tion 2036 where the arrangement is arguably without contractual
substance.8 8
Gifts of undivided interests in real estate, although possible,8 9
must be treated carefully. Where the income from the donated
fraction is diverted to the donee and there is a coincident arrange-
ment to return the income to the donor, the "gift" is subject to
estate tax.90 Further, death of the donee may result in the frac-
tional interest passing to persons other than the donor's descend-
ants with potentially disastrous results through exposure to parti-
tion.
The better solution to the lifetime gift dilemma is the creation
of an artificial legal vehicle to hold title to the assets from which
gifts are to be made, and then to make gifts of interests in this
vehicle. The corporation is ideally suited to this purpose.9 1 Indeed,
the gift planning possibilities of farm corporations seem to be the
predominant reason for their creation. Compared with transfers of
land, for example, the transfer of corporate stock is much more con-
venient.92 All that is required is the endorsement of the stock cer-
tificate by the donor, the issuance of the gift certificate to the
donee, and the issuance of the certificate for the residue to the
donor. Further, the transfer may be made privately and need not
be publicly recorded.
The use of stock allows gifts to be made of combinations of assets
which would otherwise be awkward to work with, and allows eco-
87. 31 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 1254 (1973).
88. Rickerson, Are the Tax-Saving Characteristics of Piecemeal Giving in
Danger, 27 TAx LAwYm 331 (1974).
89. Such gifts are specifically approved in Haygood v. Commissioner, 42
T.C. 936 (1964). Valuation under Treas. Reg. § 25-2511-1 (e) (1958)
is of the fractional interest given only.
90. Rickerson, supra note 88.
91. Hines, supra note 2, at 11-31.
92. Harl, supra note 18, at 380.
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nomic values of otherwise monolithic units to be transferred with-
out interruption of business activity.9 3 If the donor retains a ma-
jority of the voting stock he remains in effective control of the cor-
porate assets and can conduct the business. The fact that the ma-
jority shares are held by the decedent does not alone subject the
gifted stock to estate tax.94
Where minors are involved, corporate stock may be transferred
under the Uniform Gift to Minors Act.9 5 If the donor is not named
as custodian, the gift will not be taxed in his estate. Gifts of chattel
property or real estate are not eligible for transfer to a minor under
custodianship, 96 and are generally, unsuitable for gifts to minors,
except by irrevocable trust.
The corporation wholly insulates the going business from the
economic ownership of the business. Should one of the stock do-
nees die, the business operation will continue. Further, the close
corporation stock is readily subject to stock control and reconsolida-
tion agreements which can prevent the stock from leaving the fam-
ily in the event of death or economic disaster befalling one of the
stock holders.9 7 The irrevocable gift of chattel property or frac-
tional interests in real estate is subject to the misfortunes of the
donee in terms of judgment executions, bankruptcy, loan foreclo-
sures or divorce. Stock may be subject to a repurchase agreement
in the event of any of these occurrences, and does not allow the
transferee to interrupt the business, regardless of the method of
transfer.
There are some caveats which should be considered when mak-
ing gifts of corporate shares. Although stock of a conventional cor-
poration may be placed in trust, with the resulting flexibility re-
garding disposition, stock of a subchapter S corporation cannot be
held by a trustee,98 and stock so held does not retain its section
93. Large Farm Estates, supra note 2, at 870.
94. This does not appear to have been seriously contended by the Revenue
Service, and the holding in United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125(1972), would seem to foreclose this possibility. Compare Rev. Rul.
67-54, 1967-1 INT. Rzv. BuLL. 269, in which the Service takes the posi-
tion that the retention of all voting stock and gift of a class of non-
voting stock renders the gift taxable to the estate of the donor. Reten-
tion of control to this degree in other types of legal vehicles for the
ownership of business assets is less clear with regard to the possible
estate tax impact.
95. Har] supra note 18, at 380.
96. Id.
97. See generally Polasky, Planning for the Disposition of a Substantial
Interest in a Closely Held Business, 46 IOWA L. REv. 516 (1961).
98. CoDE § 1371(a) (2).
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1244 character.99 To this extent the use of subchapter S stock as
a gift vehicle is less flexible than stock which may be placed in
an irrevocable trust. Further, life beneficiaries of close corpora-
tion stock without a dividend history may not be allowed an an-
nual exclusion for gifts of this stock placed in trust.10 0 Such gifts
will likely be taxable if death occurs within three years of the gift,
regardless of the apparent predominance of living motives for the
gift,10 because the lack of income is deemed to constitute a pre-
dominant testamentary motivation.
Gifts should never be made to individual shareholders by con-
tributing property to the corporation. Under Herringer v. Com-
missioner,0 2 this is not a gift of a present interest to the sharehold-
ers, and no annual exclusions are allowed.
Finally, when making gifts of corporate stock care should be
taken that no overt arrangements exist for the donor to retain divi-
dends; 03 nor should there be understandings regarding salary
which would place the salary at a level in excess of income available
for dividends. 0 4 It has been held, however, that the mere fact that
the donee regularly returns dividends to the donor does not subject
the stock to tax in the absence of a prior contract.10 5
V. PLANNING FOR REDUCTION OF ESTATE VALUES
The United States Supreme Court in Byrum v. United States'0 6
recognized the integrity of the close corporation as a business form
and the separation, under state law, of ownership and economic in-
terest between shareholders. Thus, Byrum may have a significant
impact on the valuation of the estate.
99. CoDE § 1244(d) (4).
100. Stark v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 1263 (W.D. Mo. 1972), aff'd, 477
F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 975 (1973). This case
holds that such gifts are not gifts of present interests under Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2512-5(c) (1958).
101. Chanin v. United States, U.S. TAx CAS. (68-1, at 87,372) 12,522
(Ct. Cl. 1968).
102. Herringer v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1956).
103. This would clearly be a gift with possession and enjoyment retained
under Code § 2036.
104. Estate of Pamela D. Holland, 47 B.T.A. 807 (1942), modified, 1 T.C.
564 (1943). Retention of the right to pledge the donated stock as col-
lateral will also render it taxable Under Code § 2036 (a) (2). Estate
of James Gilbert, 14 T.C. 349 (1950).
105. Guelker v. United States, U.S. TAx CAS. (74-1, at 84,409) 12,992
(N.D.W. Va. 1973). Cf. Barlow 55 T.C. 666 (1972) and Hendry, 62
T.C. No. 92 (1974) dealing with continued use by the donor of donated
real estate.
106. 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
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The majority opinion recognized both the legal and economic
substance of minority share ownership in close corporation-
"Even if Byrum had transferred a majority of the stock, but had
retained voting control, he would not have retained substantial
present economic benefits."'01 7 The majority opinion also clearly
recognized the distinction between holding property through the
medium of stock in the closely held, non-public corporation and
other types of property, like publicly held stock having a ready
market. The Court noted that close corporations do not have regu-
lar and dependable earnings flow: "The typical closely held corpo-
ration is small, has a checkered earning record, and has no market
for its shares."108 These are the same elements which have been
stressed in the many decisions emphasizing the factor of "degree
of control" as substantially inhibiting the valuation of close corpo-
ration stock not having majority control. 109
Fundamental to proper valuation of close corporation stock for
estate tax purposes, and consequently to proper planning for ad-
justment of estate values through the use of close corporation
stock, is recognition of the state law rights attaching to such stock.
The primary aspects of such rights are generally:
1. A stockholding of more than 50 per cent of the issued
and outstanding stock may elect a majority of the mem-
bers of the board of directors and thereby control cor-
porate operating policy.
2. A stockholding of two thirds or more may authorize a
sale of substantially all the corporate assets11 o and may
authorize liquidation of the corporation.'
3. A stockholding of less than one third may have no im-
pact upon the decision making of the corporation.
4. A legal challenge of the dividend policy by dissatisfied
minority shareholders will be difficult if dividends are
restricted for any legitimate corporate purpose." 2
A hierachy of stock ownership in relation to stock value is thus
created:
1. A holding of 100 per cent of the corporate shares is
equivalent to full ownership of the underlying assets
107. 408 U.S. at 149.
108. Id.
109. See notes 116-17, infra.
110. E.g., NE. REv. STAT. § 21-2078(3) (Supp. 1972).
111. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2083(3) (Reissue 1970).
112. See Polasky, supra, note 97, at 591. See also B. BiTTKM & J. EusTicE,
FEDERAL TAxATIoN oF CoR oAaioNs AND SHuxEHoLDERs % 8.02, 8-6 (3d
ed. 1971).
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less only the cost of a section 333 liquidation and any
tax problem of retained earnings withdrawal.
2. A holding of less than 100 per cent but more than two
thirds of the stock allows full control of all aspects of
corporate operation and liquidation, subject to some re-
duction for "marketability" in selling the shares to oth-
ers, the potential nuisance of minority shareholder suits
for dividends, and other potential management harrass-
ment by minority shareholders.1 1
3. A holding of more than 50 per cent but less than two
thirds of the shares will result in some impairment of
value for lack of ability to liquidate the corporation and
reach the underlying assets. 1 4
4. A 50 per cent holding creates a deadlock situation
where the shareholder is better off than a minority
shareholder but cannot control management, salary or
dividend policy. Such a deadlock can result in loss of
business leadership and disastrous lack of direction for
the business enterprise.115
5. A holding of less than 50 per cent but more than one
third may not control dividends, but may be sufficient
to prevent liquidation and thus has a substantial nui-
sance value to the majority shareholder.116
6. A holding of less than one third of the oustanding stock,
particularly in an agricultural corporation, is essential-
ly worthless except to the extent that threats of suits to
compel dividends or other forms of management har-
assment may promote an offer by the majority share-
holders to purchase the shares."17
113. Estate of Gregg Maxcy, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 783 (1969).
114. Estate of Ethel C. Dooly, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 814 (1972). This is
particularly important in a farm or ranch corporation since the income,
salary and dividend potential to a controlling shareholder is of much
less economic importance than the inflationary gain in value, or the
enhancement of inventory of the underlying corporate assets.
115. Obermer v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 29 (D. Hawaii 1964). The
Government raised the argument in this case that the corporation was
the alter ego of the husband and wife shareholders, but this argument
was rejected by the court.
116. A 47 per cent stock holding was also valued in Estate of Gregg Maxcy,
28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 783 (1969).
117. Estate of Ethel C. Dooly, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 814 (1972), also in-
volved a small shareholding of 9.69 per cent. Gallun v. Commissioner,
33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1316, 1320 (1974), in valuing a minority share-
holding, makes the statement that "[o]ur next step in determining the
fair market value of the Gallun stock is to determine the proper dis-
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In an arms length situation, given the free application of com-
mon valuation principles, s8 the continually lower valuation of the
above categories of ownership in relation to the pro rata -value of
the underlying corporate assets should be recognized.11 9 In partic-
ular there is, in the words of the Byrum Court, "no market" for the
minority shares. 20 Common sense questions whether a minority
holding in an agricultural corporation could be sold to unrelated
shareholders at any price. Revenue Ruling 59-60,121 which is the
basic text for the valuation of close corporation stock, recognizes
the problems inherent in marketing minority shares. It is stated
that "the size of the block of the stock itself is a relevant factor
to be considered"' 22 and the ruling admits that a minority holding
in an unlisted corporation is "more difficult to sell than a similar
block of listed stock."'2 3
The obvious inhibition on valuation of these various levels of
stockholding at discounts realistically reflecting the true problems
of the market place is the factor of ownership of the balance of
the stock in closely related family members. The cases contain no
precise defiition of the theoretical market in which valuation of
close corporation stock takes place. The result is an inarticulate
compromise whereby such stock is not actually valued at the bru-
tally low levels which dealing with strangers alone would compel,
but neither are the shares valued on the assumption that all family
count to be applied against his net asset value." See Estate of Sidney
L. Katz, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 825 (1968).
118. Under Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1965), all estate tax items are to be
valued at "the price at which the property would change hands be-
tween a willing buyer and a willing seller .. .
119. A comprehensive discussion of the valuation of close corporation stock,
criticizing the cases for failure to sufficiently discount minority inter-
ests, is contained in Moroney, Most Courts Overvalue Closely Held
Stocks, 51 TAXES 144 (1973). The value of close corporation stock in
general, and the effect of minority interests in particular, is discussed
in Kelley, The Utility of the Close Corporation in Estate Planning and
Administration, 49 NOTRE DAME LAwYER 334, 339 (1974). See generally
STA=AnD REsEncH CONSULTANTS, CoRPoRATE SECURiTY VA .UES AS DE-
TERMvINED BY THE TAX COURT (1966).
120. 408 U.S. at 149 n.33.
121. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 INT. REv. BuLL. 237, 243, argues that control
of the corporation, either actual or in effect, represents an added ele-
ment of value which may justify a higher value for a particular block
of stock. Rev. Rul. 67-54 1967-1 INT. REv. BULL. 269, in discussing
the degree of control of the value of unlisted stock suggests that there
is additional value inherent in closely held voting shares capable of
controlling company policies. Id. § 4 (g).
122. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 INT. REv. BuLL. 237, 243.
123. Id.
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members cooperate at all times to form an effective market for the
stock.
The Service has, on occasion, advanced the argument that the
shares should be valued upward because the family group controls
other stock in the corporation. This argument appears to have been
accepted only in unusual fact situations.124 The typical approach
of courts is to value close corporation stock without regarding own-
ership of other stock in the same corporation by the other family
members. 125
A departure from this attitude does appear in Rothgery v.
United States.12 6 The case involved the valuation of a 50 per cent
interest in a family owned automobile dealership, the other 50 per
cent being owned by the decedent's son and his wife. The court
of claims discussed the effect of the participation of the son as a
"willing buyer," in light of his expressed desire to have control of
the business, and did not discount the share value. This discus-
sion is essentially dictum, however, because there were other po-
tential buyers for the decedent's shares at the price the court deter-
mined to be the value of the shares. Rothgery should be compared
with Obermer v. United States which took no family relationships
into account and discounted by one third a 50 per cent holding of
an investment company having essentially liquid investments. 127
As stated by one author:
[Ilts one thing to say buyers for the . . . minority interest could
possibly have been found among the other stockholders. Its quite
another thing to take it for granted the other stockholders would
have paid a higher price than an outsider would have paid.128
124. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 376 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1967).
125. See note 113-15 supra. See also Estate of Whitney Waterman v. Com-
missioner, 5 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 693 (1946) and Whittemore v. Fitz-
patrick, 127 F. Supp. 710 (D. Conn. 1954). Cf. Rushton v. Commis-
sioner, 498 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1974) discussing the application of the
blockage principle to individual gifts; Estate of Chloe A. Nail v.
Commissioner, 59 T.C. 187 (1972) valuing an undivided interest in
mineral rights without regard to family ownership of other fractions
of the same; Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e) (1958) indicating that a
fractional gift interest valued without regard to the total ownership of
the donor. But see Whitehead, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 253 (1974),
which adjusted the value of a fractional interest to account for other
interests held by family members in the same real estate.
126. 475 F.2d 591 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
127. 238 F. Supp. 29 (D. Hawaii 1964). This case discounted stock value
for the factor of deferred capital gain on the underlying corporate as-
sets. Contra, Gallun v. Commissioner, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1316(1974).
128. Moroney, supra note 119, at 147.
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It is hard to improve upon the foundational statement made by
the District Court for the Southern District of California that, "mi-
nority interests in a" 'closed' corporation are usually worth much
less than the proportionate share of the assets to which they at-
tach.' 29
The valuation of gifted minority stock without imputation of the
value increment remaining in the hands of the donor, even after
death, is established by the Fifth Circuit's opinion in McGehee v.
Commissioner. 30  The court held that stock taxable for estate tax
as given in contemplation of death should still be valued as minor-
ity stock, and not as stock having a value derived from the total
block held by the donor prior to the gift and otherwise included
in his estate.
In Whittemore v. Fitzpatrick,13' the government argued that
gifts made to close members of the same family at the same time
should be lumped together to establish the percentage of stock be-
ing valued. The court held that the stockholding given each indi-
vidual donee is to be valued separately at the percentage of stock
represented by each gift.
It may be argued that other family members with reason to pur-
chase stock valued as in the Rothgery case, are not "willing buy-
ers" and should be excluded from the hypothetical valuation mar-
ket, just as sales to such family members are questionable com-
parative sales because of non-business.motivation. 13 2
The principles of valuation of close corporation stock were
thoughtfully applied to stock in a ranch corporation in Estate of
Ethel C. Dooly. s3 This case involved the valuation of two sep-
arate blocks of stock in a corporation-one owned by the share-
holder and comprising 9.69 percent of the stock and the other block
being owned by a holding company to the extent of 50.01 per cent
of the stock. The Tax Court adopted the valuations proposed by
the witness for the taxpayer. These valuations were approximately
37 per cent of the underlying asset value per share for the smaller
block of stock and approximately 55 per cent of the underlying asset
129. Cravens v. Welch, 10 F. Supp. 94, 95 (SD. Cal. 1935).
130. 260 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1958).
131. 127 F. Supp. 710 (D. Conn. 1954). See also Guelker v. United States,
U.S. TAX CAS. (74-1, at 84,409) 12,992 (N.D.W. Va. 1973); Rushton v.
Commissioner, 498 F.2d Ba (5th Cir.. 1974) holding similar gifts to be
treated for purposes of the blockage discount without consideration of
companion donations.
132. See AmucAx INs~ruTE or , REArL ESTATE APPRAISES, THE APPRAISAL
OF REAL ESTATE 286 (6th ed.'1973).
133. 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 814 (1972).
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value per share for the larger block. The court made the following
statements:
Under similar circumstances, this Court has refused to uphold the
respondent's determination that the value of stock of an operating
corporation should be determined solely on the basis of asset value
... Both blocks of stock were valued with the understanding
that neither block represented power sufficient to liquidate the cor-
poration, and the difference between the value of the majority and
the minority block is due to the fact that the holder of the majority
block could control the operation of the business while the holder
of the minority block could not do so.1 34
The Dooly case also emphasizes that holding agricultural assets
in corporate form allows the taxpayer to argue that earnings cap-
italization must constitute an appraisal factor as well as comparative
sales. As the court stated: "in ascertaining the fair market value
of stock of Island Ranching, both earnings and asset value should
be considered.' u 5 Revenue Ruling 59-60136 emphasizes "earning
power" and "dividend paying capacity" as two significant factors
to be considered in valuing a corporation as a going entity and dis-
cusses the elements of the income capitalization approach, e.g., the
income of the business involved and the rate of capitalization to
be used in determining the underlying value.
In Dooly the Service attempted to negate the influence of the
income capitalization approach on value by arguing that the cap-
italization rate should be the same as the average rate of return
on a ranching operation in the area-in this case, approximately
two per cent. The mathematical effect of increasing the land value,
and causing it to approximate the comparative sales from which
the rate of return is drawn, is obvious. The Tax Court replied:
[T]he capitalization rate and the average rate of return on capital
are not the same. The capitalization rate is the rate of return at
which an investor is willing to invest his funds taking into con-
sideration the risk factor involved in the investment being con-
templated .... Thus, in determining the capitalization rate, an
investor would take into account the rate of a "riskless" investment
and add in an allowance for the risk involved in the particular in-
vestment being contemplated. In contrast, the average rate of re-
turn on capital as used by the respondent is simply the yearly in-
come of an enterprise divided by the capital invested in the cor-
poration.137
The importance of employing competent, firmly stated, profes-
sional appraisal testimony is reflected in the Dooly court's com-
134. Id. at 818.
135. Id.
136. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 INT. REV. BuLL. 237, 243.
137. 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 820. ,
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ment that "[b] ecause the petitioners' appraisers used a capitaliza-
tion rate which is within the realm of reason, and because there
is no evidence indicating that a lower rate should be used, we up-
hold the petitioners use of the 7% rate."'138 The tendency of courts
is to defer to the appraiser making the most knowledgeable pres-
entation in terms of standard and accepted appraisal theory and
practice. The result is usually a substantial discounting of non-
controlling close corporation stock in spite of the Service's argu-
ments that only comparative sales of the underlying corporate as-
sets should be referred to. Such discounting is now quite com-
monly accepted by courts and even by the Service itself. For
example, the witness for the Commissioner in Estate of Gregg Max-
cy' 3 9 agreed that a stock holding constituting 82 out of 174 issued
shares of a family held citrus fruit and cattle raising corporation
would be worth only 75 per cent of the value of a majority interest
because of its undesirability to prospective purchasers.
Revenue Ruling 59-60140 expressly recognizes the distinctive na-
ture of closely held corporations. It defines them as follows:
Closely held corporatiorm are those corporations the shares of
which are owned by a relatively limited number of stockholders.
Often the entire issue is held by one family. The result of this sit-
uation is that little, if any, trading of the shares takes place. There
is therefore, no established market for the stock and such sales as
occur at irregular intervals seldom reflect all the elements of a rep-
resentative transaction as defined by the term "fair market val-
ue.",141
The Ruling also suggests the application of earnings to market
value ratios of publicly held stocks in similar industries having a
market for their trading. This valuation aspect has little applica-
tion in farm and ranch corporations because there are few publicly
held ranching and farming enterprises, and those that exist have
generally been publicly held corporations with ranching or farm-
ing assets forming a minor portion of the corporate assets.1 42
Another consideration affecting the valuation of close corpora-
tion stock which may depress its value is the presence of first re-
138. Id.
139. 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 783 (1969).
140. Rev. RuL 59-60, 1959-1 INT. REw. BuLL. 237.
141. Id. at § 2.03.
142. See Hopkin, supra note 3, at Exhibit B, reporting the divesting of agri-
cultural holdings by two large publicly held corporations as a result
of operating inefficiencies and lack of return. Compare the tragic his-
tory of a publicly held wheat farming corporation in Kansas, detailed
in State ex tel. Boynton v. Wheat Farming Co., 137 Kan. 697, 22 P.2d
1093 (1933).
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fusal restrictions not constituting binding sale agreements. 143 In
Estate of Lucretia Eddy Cotchett144 by-law restrictions provided
that there would be no sale or transfer to a non-shareholder (other
than family members) unless the stock was first offered to the cor-
poration at the price offered by any third party, and after a waiting
period of 90 days. The Tax Court discounted the value of the shares
34 per cent below the pro-rata value of the underlying assets. The
court referred to the restrictive agreement as one of the factors
involved and reasoned that a prospective purchaser of stock would
hedge against the possibility of volatile declines in the value of un-
derlying assets during the waiting period. Such a consideration
could very well apply to a corporation having substantial livestock
assets.
These considerations suggest some specific planning possibilities.
Gifts of small percentages of stock will allow values to be carried
out of the donor's estate substantially in excess of the values re-
quired to be reported for gift tax purposes because of the stock's
discounted value. Thus, gifts of minority shares have a "leverage"
effect not present to the same degree in any other subject matter
suitable for gifts.145 The same reasoning should to some extent,
apply to general partnership and limited partnership interests, but
there is no established line of cases in this area.14
The value of stock retained in the estates of parents may be
significantly impaired where the retained ownership requires ad-
justment in value. Thus if gifts of stock reduce the donor-parent's
holding so that liquidating or operating control is lost, the value
of the remaining stock is reduced in relation to the underlying as-
sets. This obtains at least to the extent that its value is discounted
for lack of marketability and lack of management control and liqui-
dation.147
143. 1971-2 CuM. BuLL. 3, acquiescing in Estate of Pearl Gibbons Reynolds
v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 172 (1970).
144. 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 138 (1974).
145. E.g., Tishman v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Va. 1959). The
same considerations apply to gifts of undivided interests in land, but
the discount factor is substantially smaller.
146. See Rev. Rul. 68-154, 1968-1 CUM. BuLL. 395, discussing the valuation
of interests in a general partnership marketing farm products. Based
on cases therein cited, it was concluded that the value must be based
on an asset by asset valuation of the partnership properties. A general
partner, as opposed to a minority shareholder, may compel liquidation
and cash payment of his share, UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 38. See
UNIroRm LnurTED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 16 establishing the right of lim-
ited partners to compel dissolution if there is no agreement to the con-
trary.
147. See Kelley, supra note 119, at 339, 346.
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If the family assets are held so that the issuance of corporate
stock may be approximately equal between the parents, a very
modest gift program may reduce stock owned by both parents to
less than 50 per cent of the outstanding and issued stock. Assum-
ing no agreement to retain dividends or agreements by any donees
or legatees of the stock to purchase stock from the parents or their
estates, the retained stock should be valued for estate tax purposes
as minority stock.
A further variation of this gift plan can result in generation
skipping to relieve the estate tax in the second generation combined
with outright ownership of substantial values by the second genera-
tion. Stock constituting less than 50 per cent of the issued and
outstanding shares of the family corporation may be left to the suc-
cessor operators, and the balance left to the successor operator or
operators for life with special power of appointment among the de-
scendants of the first generation. Thus the second generation
shareholder may, if necessary, vote to liquidate the corporation
wholly or partially1 48 and receive up to 50 per cent of the entire
estate of the first generation parent as investment assets. If, how-
ever, the stock remains in the estate of the second generation share-
holder, it will be subject to the minority stock valuation factors.
Finally, marital deduction wills should provide a means of ob-
taining similar tax treatment. If corporate shares are distributed
so that the marital portion remaining taxable to the surviving
spouse does not constitute a controlling corporate interest, the valu-
ation principles discussed above should be equally applicable to the
stock comprising the marital share.
VI. PLANNING FOR STABILIZATION OF
ESTATE VALUES
In view of the inflationary potential of agricultural capital as-
sets and the value increases resulting from increased capital invest-
ment, efforts toward the control of estate values and enhancement
of estate liquidity,1 49 may still prove insufficient adequately to con-
trol intergeneration transfer costs. The best considered estate plan
may be substantially thrown awry by increased values in the es-
tates of parents.150 Some method of assuring that there will be no
148. The primary attack of the Revenue Service under Code § 2036 (a) in
United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972), does not apply here since
there is no transfer by the second generation person resulting in the
retained voting control
149. See notes 2-27 and accompanying text supra.
150. O'Connell, Estate Planning Devices with. Special Usefulness in Corn-
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substantial increase in the values upon which the estate plan is
based may become necessary.
A common method of "freezing" projected estate values is to sell
the assets to the next generation. The family assets, or stock in
the family corporation may be sold upon a fixed price contract pay-
able in installments or in exchange for a private annuity. 151 Dual
benefit may be obtained in estates where such an arrangement is
within the financial capability of the parties. Estate tax values
may be concretely established, and at the same time an adequate
flow of retirement income for the parents is assured.152
Binding options for the purchase of the parents' stock in the
family corporation by a child or children will similarly fix the es-
tate tax value if the option is given for a bona fide business purpose
and is exercisable during the deceased's lifetime, as well as at
death. 53 If the parent has set a specific option price at which the
successor operator is allowed to purchase an absentee shareholder's
portions of the stock in the family corporation, consideration might
be given to establishing this option during lifetime rather than only
in the wills of the parents. Until exercise of the option the parents
continue to vote the stock, increase in value is channeled to the
party having the right to exercise the option, and the estate tax
values are fixed without the necessity of a dispute with the Serv-
ice. The option price may be tied to a formula or may be revised
from time to time by mutual agreement. It should be based on
realistic initial values, or a taxable gift of the excess value of the
option price will result. When none of these approaches are con-
sidered suitable, more complex arrangements to achieve value sta-
bilization through the issuance of multi-class corporate stock may
be explored. 15 4
bating Effects of Inflation, ESTATE PIAm G 92 (Winter, 1974). See
also Kanter, Freezing Future Estate Growth, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 132
(March 1974). For an extensive discussion of various estate planning
arrangements involving private annuities, lease backs, intra-family
loans and intra-family business purchases see Estate Planning Through
Family Bargaining, 8 RALx PEOPERTY PROBATE AND TRusT J. 223 (1973).
223 (1973).
151. See Estate Planning Through Family Bargaining, supra note 150;
Reed, The private annuity: Indications for Use, Rules to be Followed,
Tax Advantages and Risks, ESTATE PLANNIG 19 (Autumn 1974).
152. Estate Planning Through Family Bargaining, supra note 150.
153. Estate of Albert L. Salt, 17 T.C. 92 (1951). See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-
2(h) (1954) and Rev. Rul. 54-76, 1954-1 CUM. BULL. 194. Such agree-
ments are also binding as to the value of other assets such as partner-
ship interests. Angela Fiorito, 33 T.C. 440 (1959).
154. Komma, Preferred Stock and the Close Corporation, ThusTs AND Es-
TATES 180 (March 1973); Kanter, supra note 150. See O'Connell, supra
note 150, at 93.
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A common method of stabilizing value is to capitalize the family
corporation with a class of preferred stock and a class of common
stock.155 The donor then makes gifts of the common stock and re-
tains the preferred shares. 56 The preferred stock should include
a dividend preference, a liquidation preference, and be subject to
redemption at a fixed price. 57 This freezes the maximum value
of the preferred stock at its redemption price and liquidation pref-
erence, and all corporate asset growth is channeled to the common
stock.
Such stock classifications may assist the handling of absentee
shareholders. The common stock can be passed to the successor
operators and the preferred stock to the absentees either with or
without an option for the successor operators to purchase the pre-
ferred. Control by the successor operators can be preserved by
making the preferred non-voting and the common voting, so that
the common will control regardless of the percentage of the cor-
porate capitalization it represents. Such arrangement may be suf-
ficient to achieve the parents' objective, without any intent to re-
consolidate stock in the hands of the operators, if there is sufficient
cash flow to provide satisfactory dividends to the absentee share-
holders. For example, such a situation may obtain at the present
time in corporations emphasizing cultivated crops rather than live-
stock.
Such multi-class stock arrangements disqualify the corporation
for subchapter S election. 5 8  If preservation of the subchapter S
election is desired, an alternative is to create debt to the extent
of the corporate capitalization considered permissible.'59 This
should be followed by gifts of the common stock. Recent develop-
ments concerning what constitutes two classes of stock for subchap-
ter S purposes indicate that corporate capitalization, to the extent
it is true debt, will not be considered a second class of stock. This
is true even if such debt is issued pro rata to the shareholders. 1 0
Capitalization with either a substantial amount of debt or nonvoting
preferred stock necessarily lowers the dollar value of common stock
which must be given away in order to reduce the stock holding
of the parents below two-thirds, or one-half of the voting stock,
with the resulting valuation effects discussed above.
If the determination has been made to use multiple classes of
155. For purposes of illustration, voting control is ignored.
156. Komma, supra note 154.
157. Id. at 209.
158. CoDE § 1371(a) (4).
159. BiTnm & EusicE, supra note 112, at 4.02 et. seq.
160. Id. 6.02, at 6-2, 6-8 (Supp. 1974).
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stock in the estate plan, gifts and bequests may be made in trust
to take advantage of the flexibility of distribution allowed by that
medium of asset ownership. 1 1 Retention of corporate control
through multiple classes of stock and trusts has been clarified some-
what by the Byritm case.162 However, this may still represent an
area of some risk. For example, Revenue Ruling 67-54103 consid-
ered a situation where classes of nonvoting preferred stock and de-
bentures were retained by the donor to the extent of the full cur-
rent value of the corporate assets. A small class of voting common
stock was also retained, and all nonvoting common stock was given
in trust. The ruling states:
Where a decedent transfers nonvoting stock in trust and holds for
the remainder of his life voting stock giving him control over the
dividend policy of the corporation, he has retained, for a period
which did not in fact end before his death, the right to determine
the income from the nonvoting stock.'0 4
The decedent had also restricted the trust from disposing of the
nonvoting stock without his consent, and the combination of his
retained rights was held to render the transfer of the nonvoting
stock taxable under section 2036.
While the valuation of preferred stock retained by the donor
is the maximum of its liquidation preference and redemption price,
these prices do not necessarily fix the minimum value. As stated
by one author:
One of the advantages of placing the voting control with the
common shares is that this may cause a substantial-future poten-
tial discount in the valuation of the preferred shares at the time of
death of the holder even though they represent a full fair market
value at the date of the exchange, since the shares are in a closely
held company and absent voting control there would be no way of
forcing a redemption of those shares and no way of liquidating the
company without the consent of the common shareholders.165
The case of William H. Mauldin66 similarly suggests that the per
share value of nonvoting preferred stock may be discounted to less
161. This is subject to the caveat regarding the dangers of stock upon which
no dividend is paid being treated as non-income producing property
if used to fund a marital type trust. See note 66 supra.
162. 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
163. Rev. Rul. 67-54, 1967-1 INT. REV. BuLL. 269.
164. Id. at 270.
165. Kanter, supra note 150, at 175. It should be noted that the liquidation
preference price and the redemption price are always set at the same
figure so that no dispute may arise as to which figure is the stock valu-
ation limit.
166. 60 T.C. 749 (1973). See also Estate of Lewis G. Kaye v. Commissioner,
32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1270 (1973).
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than face value where corporate earnings are insufficient to justify
that value.
Classes of voting and nonvoting common stock may also be used
to facilitate the transfer of voting control. 67 A smaller valuation
of sale or gift may thus be sufficient to place voting control in the
hands of the successor and reduce the stock of the parents to a
minority position.
Further, nonvoting stock may be subject to a valuation dis-
count. Revenue Ruling 67-54 takes the position that the per share
value of voting stock should be relatively larger than the per share
value of nonvoting stock.168 In Seymour Silverman 69 the Tax
Court stated: "The only point on which the expert witnesses seem-
ingly agreed was that the nonvoting stock should be treated the
same as a minority interest in a closely-held corporation.' 170 The
Court in Korslin v. United States expressly discounted stock not
having voting rights. 171
The donor may desire to make substantial stock gifts, but if the
gifts are made from one class of voting stock he would be reduced
to a minority position. Giving nonvoting shares and retaining vot-
ing stock, however, could assure control. But even if restrictions
of disposition or distribution are not retained, the applicability of
Revenue Ruling 67-54 is uncertain.
Certain other possibilities for the use of multi-class stock sug-
gest themselves. First, preferred stock may be used to fund the
marital legacy with common stock passing to the nonmarital share.
Consequently, any significant inflation in values during the surviv-
ing spouse's lifetime will not be taxed to the surviving spouse's es-
tate.
Another alternative would be to authorize, but not issue, a class
of preferred stock at the time of the initial incorporation. The un-
issued shares may be held in reserve for recapitalization if values
of corporate assets decline. This technique might be used effec-
tively, for example, in a situation where the value of livestock is
declining.
167. See Freeland & Phillips, Planning for the Large Single-asset Estate,
36 J. OF TAXATION 218, 221 (1972).
168. Oster, A Comparison of the Alternatives for Planning the Estate of an
Owner of a Clvse Corporation, 2 TAXATION FOR LAWYERS 222, 229 (Jan.-
Feb. 1974).
169. 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1321 (1974).
170. Id. at 1328 n.5.
171. U.S. TAx CAS. (73-1, at 81,224) 1 12,907 (E.D. Wis. 1973). See also
Makoff v. Commissioner, 26 CCH Tax. Ct. Mem. 83 (1967).
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Finally, multiple corporations may be used to achieve various
degrees of asset control and income distribution in response to com-
plex asset and family situations. For example, land and operating
personal property might be placed in separate corporations with
the land leased to the operating corporation. This would allow
the operating corporation to maintain subchapter S status while
multiple classes of stock in the land holding company are issued to
achieve value stabilization.
If the use of multi-class stock is desired after the original incor-
poration, a recapitalization will be necessary. Tax free reorganiza-
tion under Code section 368 (a) (1) (E) could be attained in one of
two ways. Multiple classes of common stock could be issued in
exchange for the surrender of the initial class of common stock,
or multiple classes of common and preferred stock could be issued
in such an exchange.' 72
The classic "E" reorganization is the exchange of common stock
for common and preferred. To qualify as an "E" recapitalization,
and thereby avoid any possibly of shareholder taxation on re-
tained income or capital gain on the exchanged shares, it is nec-
essary that the recapitalization have a business purpose. A pur-
pose which would meet the "business purpose" test would be assist-
ing the retirement of a shareholder and transferring business con-
trol to another.173 The Silverman case sets forth an example of
a recapitalization for the purpose of making gifts of nonvoting com-
mon stock to the donor's children and sets forth the difference in
valuation treatment between voting and nonvoting common
stock.' 74
To the extent that the corporation has retained earnings at the
time of the recapitalization, the preferred stock issued will
be "tainted" section 306 stock.175 Any redemption of such stock
is then treated as an ordinary dividend to the extent prescribed
by section 301. After the shareholder's death, however, such stock
is no longer subject to section 306.176
172. See Hanna, A Recapitalization: The E Reorganization of the Internal
Revenue Code, 27 TAx LAwYER 447 (1974), discussing the mechanics
of an E reorganization in detail, and indicating the freedom of such
a reorganization from the impact of Code § 305 in the context of re-
tirement of senior shareholders and transition of control to junior
shareholders.
173. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-3 (e) ex. 12 (1973); see Dean v. Commissioner, 10
T.C. 19 (1948).
174. 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1321 (1974).
175. See Hanna, supra note 172, at 454.
176. Treas. Reg. § 1.306-3 (e) (1973). See Komma, supra note 154, at 183.
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VII. PRESERVATION OF THE OPERATING UNIT
Several factors make it highly desirable to retain the farm unit
intact as it passes to each succeeding generation. These include the
economic emphasis on capital rather than income, the necessary
dedication of both the farm operator and his family to the work
of the business, the degree of willingness of children of agricultural
families to continue in the family enterprise, and the psychological
satisfactions of agricultural life.177
Often, however, little parental planning for the intergeneration
transition has been undertaken, and the successor operator has been
left to purchase shares of absentee children on an arms length
basis.1 78  If a substantial portion of the family wealth passes to
the operator or operators and the death taxes are manageable,
such unplanned arrangements have operated satisfactorily in many
instances. Increasingly, however, each generation faces a shortage
of capital and at the same time must begin a repurchase and re-
building effort to meet the capital needs of the operating unit.179
The result is the so called "family farm cycle" which, because of
the necessity of capital reinvestment, tends to impair the efficiency
of the agricultural enterprise. 80 Often this phenomenon is accom-
panied by lack of retirement planning for the elder generation and
undue delay in the passage of management to the succeeding genera-
tion. The effects of the cycle are exaggerated by the decreasing
efficiency of the elderly operator and the lack of incentive on the
part of those in the succeeding generation who have not developed
capital participation during the parents' lifetime. 81
The increasingly severe estate tax burden on the values required
for even the minimum economic family farm or ranch enterprise
further exaggerates the cycle and contributes to the capital crisis
which typically occurs once a generation. Thus, the likelihood that
successful rebuilding of adequate capital assets can be accomplished
by each succeeding agricultural generation is further decreased.
Effective planning for the transfer from one generation to an-
other must be undertaken, not only on a testamentary basis, but
The effect of Code § 306 may be further avoided by the use of the
holding or "container" corporation.
177. Hines, supra note 2, at 11-5, summarizing interviews made by the Uni-
versity of Iowa Agricultural Law Center.
178. Boehlje, Intergeneration Transfers: Is Agriculture Unique?, TRUSTS
AND ESTATES 172, 173 (March 1973).
179. Hines, supra note 2, at 11-5.
180. Id.
181. Boeblje, supra note 178, at 172.
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on a basis of managed lifetime transition.182 , If the typical family
farm or ranch is to remain as an operating unit, the parents must
prepare themselves to make the transfer of ownership and manage-
ment control in a manner which will assure that the tax burden
and buy-out costs of the succeeding operators are within reasonable
limits. 8 3 This process is greatly facilitated by creating ownership
forms designed to accomplish the devolution and conservation of
family capital. The close corporation offers particular advantages
in planning for the transition of the family agricultural enter-
prise.18 4 As one study has stated:
Thus when the dual criteria of preserving operational continuity
and enhancing business opportunities are considered, the farm
corporation is easily the best of the three alternative business
forms. As farm size and income increase, these business planning
attributes will make the farm corporation an increasingly attrac-
tive estate planning tool.185
Often, the parents who have invested their entire adult life in
building an efficient enterprise are reluctant to suffer the loss
of control resulting from gift transfers of specific assets or fractions
of assets. The corporation dramatically eases this problem because
of the legal attributes of the corporate entity. 8 0 If gifts of stock
are coupled with testamentary planning and provisions have been
made for dealing with absentee heirs, the successor operators may
proceed with sure knowledge that their devotion to the family
business will not be wasted following the death of their parents. 8 7
VIII. PLANNING FOR
RECONSOLIDATION OF OWNERSHIP
The dilemma of how to maintain the farm or ranch as an oper-
ating entity from one generation to the next while still being fair
to absentee children is the most difficult issue of farm and ranch
estate planning.' 8  The corporate solution provides several alterna-
tives for approaching this problem.
The use of the corporate form allows stock ownership, and con-
sequently income participation, to be distributed among operating
182. Fiore, Analyzing and Planning the Finances and Estate of the Family
Engaged in Agricultural Business, 1 ESTATE PLANNING 96 (1974). The
importance of lifetime estate management planning for the farm fam-
ily is emphasized in Boehlje, supra note 178.
183. See Boehlje, supra note 178; Harl, supra note 18, at 367.
184. See Harl, supra note 18; Large Farm Estates, supra note 2, at 870.
185. Large Farm Estates, supra note 2, at 873.
186. See Section II supra.
187. Id. See also Boehlje, supra note 178, at 175.
188. Harl, supra note 18, at 378.
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and absentee heirs. Through voting control devices, trusts or mul-
tiple classes of voting and nonvoting stock, control of the enterprise
can be placed in the operating heirs even though they may own
a minority of the stock.' 89 Theoretically, at least, by employing
this device capital of the absentee heirs could be retained in the
business at no fixed cost to the business. However, a low rate
of income and the typical desire in agriculture to retain as much
operating income as possible for expansion or debt reduction may
produce inequities and dissatisfied absentee shareholders.
Incorporation automatically eliminates the possibility of a real
estate partition through which the donee or legatee of an undivided
interest in real estate may compel sale. 110 When the assets (such
as cultivated land operated by tenants) yield an adequate rate of
return and when there is no debt which would impair the ability
to pay dividends, the corporate form may fulfill a desire on a part
of the parents to keep their holdings intact while still giving all
the children equal participation. This approach may be coupled
with a farm lease to the operating children, or a ranch lease to
a separate entity owned by the operating children in which the op-
erating livestock reposes."9" Alternatively, the corporation may
serve as a vehicle to give the successor operators control of man-
agement during the period of time when the legacies to absentee
shareholders are being funded and to provide a medium for the
purchase of the stock of said shareholders.
One approach is for the parents to establish specific cash
amounts which provide fair legacies to the absentee shareholders,
the funding of which is within the reasonable economic capabilities
of the operating unit, or to create a formula based on date of death
values which will arrive at such a sum. Those involved should rec-
ognize the economic fact that if the agricultural assets are to be
held intact by the successor operators, their rate of return will be
far lower than the return the absentee heirs are likely to obtain
upon the investment of their cash legacies.' 92 One method of ar-
riving at the value of these legacies is to compute a sum which
the absentee heirs' share of anticipated income from the family en-
terprise would produce when capitalized at the going rate of return
for conservative financial investments. 93
189. Id. at 379.
190. Id.
191. Fiore, supra note 182, at 99.
192. Harl, supra note 18, at 379.
193. See Kelley, Estate Planning for Farmers and Ranchers, PRAc. LAw.
(Oct. 1974), at 24.
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If the successor operators are given the option to purchase shares
of the absentee children at such sums, the successor may then de-
cide after the death of the parents whether it is feasible to exercise
the option. Alternatively, the absentee children may be given the
option of cashing out their shares. The cash amount of such an
option should be sufficiently low to give the absentee children in-
centive to leave their capital in the business. But it should be suf-
ficiently high so that they can realize reasonable cash funds if they
do not consider the dividend return from their stock adequate.
The-parents may consider how far in the future (i.e., how many
generations) they wish to attempt preservation of the operating
unit. It may be that only a single generation is feasible, which
can be accomplished by lease arrangements in the manner sug-
gested above. On the other hand, protection of the family enter-
prise from estate tax at the death of the second generation together
with preservation of the operating unit during the lifetime of the
second generation may be accomplished by generation-skipping
transfers. Thus, stock may be given to the successor operators for
life, with a limited power of appointment (perhaps confined to lin-
eal descendants of the parents).'94 This can be done by creating
legal life estates in corporate stock, without the intervention of a
trust which would jeopardize the option for subchapter S elec-
tion.195 As a result, the family enterprise is held intact, but since
it is owned by the corporation rather than by the individuals, all
assets may be sold, operated or mortgaged without regard to the
complexities of stock ownership. When stock is spread among the
second generation in this manner, it is critical that carefully consid-
ered reconsolidation arrangements be included if ownership in the
operators is necessary because of low income flow or otherwise.
In addition to option purchase arrangements, discussed above,
if more than one person is to remain a shareholder during contin-
ued operation of the enterprise, an appropriate agreement restrict-
ing transfer of the stock is essential.19 6 Such an agreement may
create options for corporate redemption of the stock or purchase
by other shareholders upon events typically covered in arms-
length buy-sell agreements such as death of a shareholder, attempted
sale or disposition of shares to non-family members, bankruptcy,
194. Casner, supra note 62.
195. CODE § 1371(a) (2); Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1 (1959).
196. Comment, Considerations When Incorporating the Family Farm, 39
NEB. L. REV. 547, 555 (1960). Various types of stock transfer restrictions
are comprehensively discussed at F. O'NEAT, CLOsE CoxoRA ioNs:
LAW Am PRAcTicE § 7.01 (1958).
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divorce, execution of judgment liens, foreclosure of stock pledges
to secure loans, or other personal or financial calamities. The
primary consideration in such arrangements is determining the
option price. 97 A number of alternatives are available: the price
may be related to federal estate tax or state inheritance tax
appraisal values; the price-may be at par or book value, although
such amounts tend to be below market value and may lead to
tontine-like arrangements whereby the shareholder to live the
longest receives a windfall;198 or the price may be arrived at by
an annual revision method, with or without alternative appraisal
backup, in the manner in which conventional buy-sell agreements
are often arranged.
IX. POST-MORTEM PLANNING
In addition to the lifetime planning appraoches for estate tax
minimization, certain post-mortem planning options are available
which can greatly contribute toward lessening the economic impact
of intergeneration transfer.
A significant income tax benefit in the estate of agricultural op-
erators (and unavailable to landlords) is that the step-up in basis
of assets owned at death applies to zero basis raised properties
(crops and livestock) which otherwise would produce ordinary in-
come when sold.199 In addition, if the alternate valuation date is
elected, the gain (such as the gain in weight of calves) between
date of death and the six month alternate valuation date is elimi-
nated from income.200  The advantage of the step-up in basis for
property the sale of which would generate ordinary income is fur-
ther enhanced because property which would ordinarily trigger the
recapture of previous depreciation deductions or Excess Deduc-
tions Account expenses when sold does not result in recapture to
the estate.201
197. Considerations When Incorporating The Family Farm, supra note 196,
at 559.
198. Kelley, supra note 119, at 353.
199. Rev. Rul 64-289, 1964-2 Cum. BuLL. 173. See also Rev, Rul 58-436,
1958-2 Cum. BUL. 366. See Morrison and Vacovsky, Estate and In-
-- - come Tax Treatment of- a Decedents -Farm -Crops and Rents, 4 CEIGH-
TON L. Rlv. 67 (1970-71). This includes raised and harvested grain,
unharvested crops in place, raised calves, and older livestdck.
200. Rev. Rul. 58-436, 1958-2 Cum. Bu-m. 366. The'recapture provisions of
Code § 1251 relating to farm losses used to off-set non-farm income,
Code § 1252 relating to the gain upon the sale of farm land held for
less than ten years, and the recapture provisions of Code § 1245 do
not apply to farm property passing at- the owners death, by reason
of the increase in basis under Code § 1014.,
201. Treas. Reg. § 1.1223-1(j) (1957).
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Another tax advantage was added by the 1969 Tax Reform Act
which added section 1223(11), providing that property having
a basis determined under section 1014 is to be considered as prop-
erty held for more than six months if disposed of within six months
after death. Regulations under this section 191 specifically provide
that property considered to be held for six months under section
1223(11) is considered that type of property for purposes of section
1231(b) (3) which extends long term capital gain treatment to cat-
tle and horses held for more than twenty-four months and other
livestock held for more than twelve months. It appears that such
assets now qualify for capital gain treatment if sold within six
months following death.
The farm landlord may treat in-kind rentals which are separated
to him, but not sold, as income in respect of a decedent, and thereby
achieve some income tax benefit.20 2
One of the disadvantages of incorporating agrictultural enter-
prises is that it sacrifices the income tax benefits otherwise available
in the course of estate administration. The step-up in basis applies
to the corporate stock only, not to the properties owned by the cor-
poration.20 3 Liquidation of the corporation shortly following death
would be necessary to achieve any of these income tax benefits.
If the formation of the corporation was motivated by a desire to
hold the corporate property intact, this normally will not be a de-
sirable alternative. Liquidation might be considered, however,
where the corporation was formed only to facilitate gifts and the
only legatees are the corporate operator or operators who do not
feel the need of continuing business in the corporate form.20 4
The significant estate income tax advantages accruing from care-
ful selection of the estate fiscal year may also be lost to the estate
which holds substantial incorporated assets. Typically, the estate's
income tax year is selected to trap income in the estate at income
tax brackets lower than those of the estate distributees, and to defer
income tax for an additional year with regard to income distributed
to the legatees. 20 5
If the corporation is conventional, dividends may be declared
202. CODE § 691.
203. CODE § 1014.
204. See McQuiston & Ballard, Current Status of the Liquidation-Reincor-
poration Problem, 31 J. TAxATIox 328 (1969). (Later reincorporation
should be carefully evaluated in the light of the common liquidation-
reincorporation principles which allow the later reincorporation to be
disregarded for income tax reasons.)
205. See Desmond, Taxation of Estate Income, 113 TRusTs & ESTATS 728
(1974).
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any time during administration of the estate to gain the benefits
of election of the estate fiscal year achieved, but it may be unde-
sirable to declare dividends for other income tax reasons. Similarly
the subchapter S corporation may declare and pay a dividend at any
time and place specific cash distributions within the year taxable
to the estate. Dividend timing from the subchapter S corporation
and the election of the estate fiscal year must be carefully coordi-
nated to avoid inappropriate diversions of income resulting from
the constructive dividend of undistributed taxable income on the
last day of the corporation's fiscal year.206 An additional considera-
tion where a subchapter S corpoation is involved is that the exec-
utor is a new shareholder and must file a consent to the subchapter
S election within 30 days of appointment.20 7 Although a trust
holding shares disqualifies the subchapter S election, an estate does
not.
2 08
If the corporate stock exceeds 35 per cent of the gross estate,
or 50 per cent of the taxable estate, it may be redeemed by the
estate under section 303 to the extent of estate taxes and funeral
and administrative expenses. 20 9 Technically, the result is capital
gain to the estate with the redemption treated as a sale of the stock,
resulting in the elimination of dividend treatment if the corporation
has retained earnings. Since the stock basis was stepped up at the
date of death, there is no taxable gain if the redemption is at the
date of death value per share. Section 303 redemptions must occur
within three years and ninety days after the filing of the estate
tax return and be fully paid and completed within that time.210
If the corporation cannot complete the redemption in that period,
or if the redemption spread over a longer period is desired, (such
as to fund payments resulting from a section 6166 election 21 1 ) notes
from the corporation payable in later installments may be distrib-
uted iM redemption of the stock. Stock redemptions in excess of
the allowable section 303 levels will be taxed as ordinary income
to the extent of retained earnings unless qualifying for capital gains
treament under section 302.212
206. See generally McGaffey, Estate Planning and the Subchapter S Cor-
poration, 112 TRUSTS & ESTATES 6 (1973) (discussion of handling sub-
chapter S stock in the course of estate administration).
207. CoDE § 1372(e) (1).
208. CODE § 1371(d) (2).
209. See Estates, Gifts and Trusts No. 242, TAx MANAGEATENT PORTFOLIO(BNA, 1970) (mechanics of § 303 redemption). See also Oster, supra
note 168.
210. CODE § 303(b) (1).
211. See note 214 and accompanying text infra.
212. Silberberg, Post Mortem Tax Planning for Estates with Substantial
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If the corporation has had subchapter S status since its incep-
tion, or if there are no retained earnings, the stock may be redeemed
from the estate by the corporation without dividend consequence.
Again, if such redemption is at the date of the death value per
share, there is no taxable capital gain to the estate. Theoretically,
in either conventional or subchapter S corporations, if the stock
is redeemed at the value listed on the return, and the date of death
value is substantially raised on audit, the possibility arises that the
difference is a gift to the shareholders by the legatees of the estate.
Under Herringer v. Commissioner2 13 no annual exclusions would
be allowed for such a gift. Perhaps such a situation could be
avoided by deliberately structuring the redemption to trigger an
increase in redemption price if stock value is incrased on audit of
the estate tax return.
There may be an advantage to the estate of the agricultural
operator in the election, made available in 1968 under section 6166,
to pay that portion of the estate tax attributable pro rata to quali-
fying assets in ten equal installments. 214 Such assets must be those
applied to the conduct of an active business, including an incorpor-
ated business, and the corporate stock, partnership interest, or
propriatorship assets must exceed 35 per cent of the gross estate or
50 per cent of the taxable estate. Corporate stock to be eligible must
exceed 20 per cent of the issued and outstanding stock or must be
stock of a corporation having 10 or fewer shareholders.21 5 In this
respect, the qualifying number of shareholders is counted differently
than under subchapter S. A husband and wife owning property as
joint tenants count as two shareholders rather than one as is the
case in qualification for the subchapter S election.2 1 6
The section 6166 election provides significant relief to the closely
held active business at the present interest rate. Even with the
interest rate increased, the automatic financing of the estate tax
remains a valuable option. The installment payment of estate tax
may be calculated to coincide with the installment payment of
options for successor operators to purchase the interest of absentee
Holdings of Closely Held Stock, 2 TAxATIoN FOR LAWYERS 342, 345
(1974). See generally Crumbley & Taylor, Redeeming Stock of Sub-
chapter S Shareholders, 52 TAxES '74 (1974) (redemptions qualifying
under § 302).
213. 235 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1956).
214. See generally Silberberg, supra note 212, at 345; Miller, Several Routes
are Available to Obtain an Extension of Time for Payment of Estate
Taxes, 3 TAxATION FOR LAWYERs 96 (1974) (application of the § 6166
election).
215. Treas. Reg. § 20.6166-2(a) (1960).
216. Treas. Reg. § 20.6166-2(b) (1960).
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shareholders. In determining the option price to be paid, under
stock reconsolidation arrangements and the terms for installment
payment of such price, the effect of section 6166 option should be
calculated, and the option price adjusted for estate taxes. There are
other, but less valuable, alternatives under section 6161 for extend-
ing the time for payment of estate taxes for "reasonable cause" or
"undue hardship. '2 17
Where a legal life estate and remainders in corporate stock are
used to avoid the subchapter S termination effect of trust interests,
and such remainders are vested by the terms of the owner's will
or through the exercise of a lifetime power of appointment by the
life tenant, Code section 6163 comes into play. If a remainderman
fails to survive the life tenant, his estate may elect to defer the
payment of the estate tax pro-rated to the reversionary or remain-
der interest until six months after termination of the life estate.
Further extension may be had for undue hardship.
If the estate includes stock of a currently electing subchapter
S corporation, the history of the corporation should be reviewed
to determine whether it has retained earnings generated from any
period of activity as a conventional corporation, or otherwise. Farm
or ranch corporations will generally have unwithdrawn, previously
taxed income ("PTI") at the time of death. If any of these retained
earnings were generated before the corporation elected subchapter
S status, withdrawals, dividends or redemptions must be examined.
Although the decedent could have withdrawn funds from the cor-
poration before his death which would have been applied against
the PTI and would not have been taxed in the hands of the share-
holder, this is a personal privilege of the decedent and terminates
at death. The PTI account is thus eliminated and not available to
the executor. 218 If PTI is accumulated during the administration of
the estate, the same situation obtains upon distribution of the sub-
chapter S stock at the end of the estate administration. The execu-
tor's PTI account terminates and is not available to the distrib-
utee. 219 Any sums then withdrawn by the distributee in excess of
current undistributed taxable income will be taxable dividends to
the extent the corporation continues to have retained earnings.
A significant post-mortem factor is the effect of incorporation on
the whole process of estate administration. 220  The complexities of
accounting, obtaining court orders to authorize conduct of business
217. See Miller, supra note 214.
218. See McGaffey, supra note 206.
219. Id.
220. Kelley, supra note 119, at 338.
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or sales of business property, and the problems incident to the op-
eration of business assets and their distribution at the end of the
estate are eliminated by incorporating such assets. Only the corpo-
rate stock is subject to administration and only dividends paid or
amounts received in redemption of stock need be included in the
executor's accounts. The corporate business and business decisions
continue uninterrupted by the probate process, privacy of the busi-
ness accounts is obtainable (to the extent they are not required
to be placed on public record in the process of inheritance tax deter-
mination), and the fiduciary handles only corporate stock and need
not manage the business enterprise.
A further possibility is that the executor may be directed to
incorporate the estate assets, or some of them, for the purpose of
using the corporate vehicle to manage business assets and pass busi-
ness ownership to succeeding legatees. Where the testamentary
trust may be an inadequate vehicle for the operation of a continuing
business enterprise, the creation of a testamentary corporation may
serve a useful purpose.
X. CONCLUSION
The use of artificial devices of asset ownership to create divisible
property rights in assets otherwise impossible or awkward to divide
is a useful estate planning device. The corporation may effectively
serve as such a device. From the property standpoint alone, it pro-
vides a simple and efficient mechanism for creating future inter-
ests and the fractional division of absolute ownerships in properties
involving any combination of short-lived assets or going business
operations which might otherwise be extremely difficult to distrib-
ute.
Stock in a corporation holding the family agricultural assets pro-
vides a convenient medium for complex intergeneration successions,
including divisions at various times and among various persons, and
allows complex divisions of the rights to control the property, re-
ceive the income from the property, and own the economic substance
of the property. Such divisions are often necessary to minimize
federal estate tax, preserve and centralize management of family
capital, and allow participation by family members not forming
part of the operating management.
The corporation is, however, a paradoxical device. While greatly
simplifying intergenerational devolution of property in many ways,
it contains inherent income tax complexities which must be care-
fully evaluated and administered. It involves detailed record keep-
ing and requires the former sole proprietor to develop habits nec-
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essary to work within an organizational format. The choice of the
corporate farm sacrifices some post-mortem income tax advantages,
but may offer the possibility of income tax saving on earnings rein-
vested in the business.
As an artificial legal person, the family corporation requires pro-
fessional care and feeding. The estate planner's job is not finished
with the formation of the corporation and its use in the family life-
time and testamentary transfers. Its record keeping must be super-
vised and decisions which may effect taxability must be carefully
monitored throughout its existence.
While use of the close corporation in farm and ranch estate plan-
ning must be evaluated to determine its benefits and disadvantages
for a particular family, it offers great potential for controlling death
tax burdens, as well as facilitating inheritance. As the inflation
of farm and asset values insidiously works to sap the economic
strength of family agricultural enterprises through ever increasing
death taxes, many such enterprises will be confronted with the ne-
cessity of adopting carefully considered and highly sophisticated es-
tate planning approaches if their integrity is to be defended.
The corporation provides, both through its basic form and the
well traveled paths of law concerning its taxability and stock valua-
tion, some unique opportunities. The loss of flexibility in dealing
with the family assets is a relatively small price to pay for the fam-
ily which seeks intergenerational stability of asset ownership. The
facets of incorporation which would be severe handicaps to more
volatile types of business are actually advantageous in preserving
the family farm or ranch unit between generations.
Thoughtful consideration of the many aspects of incorporation
as an estate planning device serves to illustrate to the estate plan-
ner that there are no panaceas for tax avoidance and efficient prop-
erty devolution. Each situation must be analyzed on its own terms
and treated by using legal tools adapted to the desires, personali-
ties and asset mix of each family.
